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VILNIUS EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT: MILESTONE IN EU-RUSSIA
RELATIONS – NOT JUST FOR UKRAINE
Peter Havlik1
Abstract
The Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit on 28–29th November 2013 represents a mile-
stone in EU relations not just with respect to the six Eastern Partnership countries (EaP
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and particularly Ukraine), but also with
the EU’s ‘strategic partner’ Russia. The turbulence and numerous speculations regarding
expectations about the signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (comprising
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement – AA/DCFTA), as well as progress
in initialling similar future agreements with Georgia and Moldova, have been escalating
before the summit. The association agreements would bring EaP signatory countries closer
to the EU not really closer to EU membership, but closer to the application of various EU
norms and standards (takeover of the ‘acquis communautaire’) and – significantly – out of
the Russian orbit, for the beginning at least symbolically. The last minute postponement of
the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA signature announced by Ukraine’s government just one week
before the summit represents a serious setback for the EU. Though the EU has no ‘Plan
B’ and was stunned after Ukraine’s announcement, life will continue after the summit and
new initiatives will have to be started.What are the relevant issues and challenges and what
is at stake? This note attempts to evaluate the consequences (economic and otherwise) of
alternate decisions following the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, reviews some of
the disputed arguments and discusses selected relevant economic issues.
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I. Introduction
The Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit on 28–29 November 2013 represents a mile-
stone in EU relations not just with respect to the six Eastern Partnership countries (EaP:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and particularly Ukraine), but also with
the EU’s ‘strategic partner’, Russia. The turbulence and numerous speculations regarding
expectations about the signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (comprising
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement – AA/DCFTA), as well as progress
in initialling similar future agreements with Georgia and Moldova, escalated before the
summit. The association agreements would bring EaP signatory countries closer to the
EU: not really closer to EU membership, but closer to the application of various EU
norms and standards (takeover of the ‘acquis communautaire’) and – significantly – out
of the Russian orbit, at least symbolically at first. The postponement of the EU-Ukraine
AA/DCFTA signature – Ukraine’s government halted the related preparations just one
week before the summit – represents a serious setback for the EU, while Russia has gained
another strategic point, at least for a while.2 Though the EU has no ‘Plan B’ and EU
High Representative Catherine Ashton expressed her disappointment immediately after
Ukraine’s announcement, life will continue after the summit and new initiatives will have
to be started.
What are the relevant issues and challenges andwhat is at stake? This note briefly discusses
the positions of the key individual parties (the European Union, Ukraine and Russia),
presents details on foreign trade and tariff data and attempts to evaluate the consequences
(economic and otherwise) of alternate decisions following the Vilnius Eastern Partnership
Summit. It also reviews some of the disputed arguments and discusses selected relevant
economic issues.
II. Tug-of-war over Ukraine
In its present form, the conclusion and implementation of an AA/DCFTA between Ukraine
and the EU has been presented by both the EU and Russia as incompatible with the partici-
pation of EaP countries in the Russian-led Customs Union (BRK-CU: the other members
being Belarus and Kazakhstan) and especially with Ukraine joining the envisaged ‘deeper
and wider’ post-Soviet integration project in the framework of the Eurasian Union and the
Single Economic Space (SES).3 Until compromise solutions regarding tariff regimes have
been negotiated, the two directions for integration – either with the EU or participation
in the BRK-CU/SES – are indeed incompatible. Russia’s ‘success’ in luring Armenia into
the BRK-CU instead of opting for an AA/DCFTA with the EU, as announced on 3 Sep-
tember, 2013, was initially interpreted by some in the EU as incompatible with Armenia’s
2 Ukraine’s government proposed the establishment of a tripartite commission with the EU and Russia in order
to jointly discuss trade and economic issues – see www.gazeta.ru, 21 November, 2013. The interruption of the
AA/DCFTA process was presented by Ukraine’s Prime Minister Mykola Azarov as a ‘tactical decision’ driven
solely by economic reasoning.
3 The Eurasian Union (EurAz) currently includes, apart from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. The future Eurasian Union and SES envisages a common market entailing ‘four freedoms’ modelled
on the EU experience.
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prospective conclusion of an AA/DCFTA. Later on, European Commissioner for Enlarge-
ment and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle attempted to de-escalate tensions and tried to
dismiss such fears by stating in October at a conference in Kyiv that the AA/DCFTA should
‘not be seen as a threat but as an opportunity, a contribution to creating an area of free trade
between Lisbon and Vladivostok’. Furthermore, he explained that the European Commis-
sion is ‘working on the issue of legal incompatibility between the Association Agreement
and Customs Union’, while requiring once again that Ukraine shows ‘determined action’
and delivers ‘tangible progress on all European Union benchmarks’.4 Ukraine, for its part,
would opt for signing the AA/DCFTA agreement (a corresponding decision was already
adopted by Ukraine’s government in September 2013) while, ideally, desiring to ‘cherry
pick’ and maintain and develop good relations with both the Russian-led Customs Union
and the EU. One of the EU’s key demands – to cease the application of ‘selective justice’
and in particular the release of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison –
will obviously not be fulfilled, at least not before the Vilnius Summit.5
III. Russia’s bullying pays off
To deal first with Russia, there has been some history of this country’s use of economic
sanctions in order to retaliate for perceived unwelcome political developments in the ‘near
abroad’. Russian sanctions ranged from import bans on Georgian wine and mineral water
in 2004–06 after the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia, the interruption of gas deliveries to
Ukraine and Belarus related to disputes over pricing and access to pipelines, restricting the
import of wine and spirits from Moldova, imposing import restrictions on dairy products
and chocolate from Ukraine, on dairy product imports from Lithuania, etc.6 The latest
sore point in Russian external relations with potentially severe economic consequences has
been Russia’s concentrated efforts in bullying Ukraine (as well as Georgia and Moldova)
related to the envisaged AA/DCFTA signature at the forthcoming Eastern Partnership
Summit in Vilnius.7 The frequency and intensity of Russia’s rather crude attempts to
prevent Ukraine from signing the AA/DCFTA prior to the Vilnius Summit and to ‘explain
the adverse consequences of the signature’, together with simultaneous efforts to ‘lure’
Ukraine into joining the Russian-led Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, esca-
lated before the Vilnius Summit.8 Repeatedly, Sergey Glazyev, one of President Putin’s
4 See Füle (2013a, 2013b). The latter requirement was spelled out by Mr Füle in a speech before the Ukrainian
parliament in Kyiv on the same day (Füle, 2013c).
5 EU foreign affairs ministers reiterated conditions for signing the AA/DCFTA agreement at their meeting on
18November, 2013, in Brussels as follows: ‘Determined action and tangible progress is needed in three areas: the
compliance of the parliamentary elections with international standards, addressing the issue of selective justice
and preventing its recurrence, and the implementation of the reforms jointly agreed in the Association Agenda’
(http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ukraine-way-reform/analysts-slam-germany-ukraine-po-news-531768).
6 It must be added, for the sake of completeness, that Russia also employed trade sanctions – with varying
justification – with respect to imports of US poultry, Polish pork, Dutch flowers, etc.
7 See Moldova’s Foreign and European Integration Minister (who is also chief AA negotiator) Natalia Gherman
at Euractiv.com, published on 30 October, 2013, and the interview with newly elected Georgian President Giorgi
Margvelashvili in Kommersant Vlast’, No. 41, October 2013, respectively.
8 There was even a ‘secret’ (although leaked) strategy for preventing Ukraine from signing the AA/DCFTA
agreement published in August by the Ukrainian paper Zerkalo Nedely – see http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/o-
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economic advisors, lectured Ukraine on the alleged adverse consequences of signing the
‘discriminative’ AA/DCFTA agreement while simultaneously threatening Russian sanc-
tions. Indeed, Russian border controls on Ukrainian exports were briefly introduced (on
a ‘trial’ basis, but still violating the CIS FTA agreements where Ukraine participates)
while simultaneously praising the economic benefits of Ukraine joining the Customs
Union. Similar warnings were spelled out by Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir
Chizhov and reiterated, albeit in a more polite form, by Russian First Deputy Prime Mini-
ster Igor Shuvalov, who is in charge of EurAz economic relations in Russia.9 Last but not
least, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev warned his Ukrainian colleague Mykola
Azarov that after signing the AA/DCFTA Ukraine will have ‘zero chance’ of full-scale
CU membership, while Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov mentioned the
possibility of tightened border controls between the two countries.10 The latest serious
and immediate threat was expressed by Mr Medvedev at the beginning of November
in connection with Ukraine’s payment arrears for Russian gas deliveries (amounting to
nearly USD 900 million as of August 2013). Prime Minister Medvedev required prompt
debt repayment, rejected new Russian credit and required a pre-payment for additional
gas deliveries (envisaged by the existing contract with Gazprom) while suggesting that,
if necessary, Ukraine should ask the EU for financial assistance instead.11 Meanwhile,
Ukraine is also being squeezed by the IMF, which is urging the government to reduce
budgetary expenditures and raise domestic gas tariffs, as well as to implement a number
of other unpopular reforms before resuming new financing.12
Russia’s bullying attempts to pressure its neighbours to ‘integrate’ with Russia instead
of with the EU was seen as counterproductive not only by many Ukrainians and most
outside observers, but even by a number of commentators in Russia.13 On the other hand,
a negative view regarding the consequences of an AA/DCFTA signature is shared by
Ukraine’s communists, who claim – probably correctly – that the country has no prospects
of joining the EU in the next 20–30 years and that the implementation of EU regulations
would be too costly, while EU integration is allegedly supported by just 40% of Ukraini-
ans.14 Last but not least, there have been tensions among current BRK-CU members as
neither Belarus nor Kazakhstan – the two other members of BRK-CU – are particularly
happy with current Russian dealings related to the CU stance. For example, at the recent
BRK-CU summit in Minsk (end-October 2013), Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev
komplekse-mer-po-vovlecheniyu-ukrainy-v-evraziyskiy-integracionnyy-process- .html.
9 See http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/top-envoy-russia-offer-ukraine-e-news-530890 and http://www.eur-
activ.com/europes-east/russia-reiterates-warnings-ukrai-news-530671.
10 See report from the meeting of the two prime ministers in Kaluga on 15October, 2013 (www.gazeta.ru/busi-
ness/2013/10/15). For Lavrov’s speech, seehttp://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/10/28 a 5727929.shtml.
11 See www.gazeta.ru, 4 November, 2013.
12 See IMF Mission Statement to Ukraine, Press Release No. 13/419, 31 October, 2013.
13 See, for instance, http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/print/2013/10/29/18070451, K. Sonin and Financial Ti-
mes, 4 November, 2013, p. 9.
14 See http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/ukrainian-communists-expose-myth-news-531359. It must be ad-
ded that the high costs and the rationality of the request to take over the ‘acquis’ and other provisions of the
DCFTA without prospects for EU accession is criticised by other observers as well (Dreyer, 2012). The earlier
experience of CEE NMS suggests that ‘acquis takeover’ is indeed costly and problematic (Havlik, 2003).
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complained about the ‘excessive politicisation’ of the CU Commission’s decisions pur-
sued by Russian representatives who are ‘not independent enough’ from the government
(a situation which contradicts CU Commission statutes). Furthermore, Belarus President
Alexander Lukashenko complained at the same summit about increased bureaucratic ob-
stacles in BRK-CU customs procedures and delays in other integration steps.15 On the
sidelines, Mr Nazarbayev also suggested inviting Turkey to join the BRK-CU.16
IV. EU’s failed Eastern Partnership
Following a number of resolute previous ‘either/or’ statements regarding the direction
of integration by various EU representatives, European Commissioner for Enlargement
and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle attempted to de-escalate the situation, declaring
that this issue ‘is not a choice between Moscow and Brussels’ and promised Ukraine
a speedier AA/DCFTA implementation after the Vilnius summit. Mr Füle also declared
that the European Commission is ‘working on overcoming the issues of legal compatibility
between the AA and CU’ in order to ‘prevent new walls in Europe’,17 and sharply rebuked
claims regarding the adverse effects of an AA/DCFTA.18 On the same day, Mr Füle
announced a ‘post-Vilnius agenda’ for Ukraine which would include financial assistance to
support the implementation of the Association Agreement amounting to EUR 186 million
and move ahead with macro-financial assistance of EUR 610 million, ‘once the conditions
are in place’ (ibid). The current EU stance with respect to both Eastern Partnership
countries and the ‘partnership for modernisation’ with Russia, as well as the lack of
a corresponding longer-term strategy, have long been criticised by numerous observers
and experts.19
V. Economic integration effects
Available studies dealing with the (economic) effects of alternative integration agreements
provide widely conflicting results, depending on methods, assumptions and data sources.
One of the common findings of these studies is that (economic) effects on Russia (or
the EU for that matter) are asymmetric: they are rather small compared to the effects on
smaller prospective integration partners such as Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia or Moldova
– owing to the sheer size of the Russian/EU economy (see, among others, Astrov et
al., 2012; EDB, 2012, 2013; Vinokurov and Libman, 2012; Dabrowski and Taran, 2012;
15 See http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/print/2013/10/25/17942981.
16 Ibid. Note that Turkey has been in a customs union with the EU since the mid-1990s.
17 See Mr Füle’s speech at the conference in Yalta, Ukraine, on 20 September, 2013.
18 See the above quoted speeches by Mr Füle at the international conference in Kyiv and before the Ukrainian
Parliament on 11 October, 2013, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-13-808 en.htm and 13-810
(ibid).
19 See, for example,Wallace (2009), Grant (2011), Emerson (2011a) and recent statements byGerman Bundestag
MP Karl-Gerog Wellmann and former EU Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen during a panel dis-
cussion in Berlin on 18 November, 2013, (http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-ukraine-way-reform/analysts-
slam-germany-ukraine-po-news-531768). Similar views have recently been expressed also by French diplomats
(http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/france-supports-association-agre-news-531726as), as well as by Youngs
and Pishchikova (2013) and Wisniewski (2013).
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Dreyer, 2012; Movchan and Shportyuk, 2012; EBRD, 2012). Another common finding of
most integration studies is that (mostly short-term) tariff reduction effects are relatively
small compared to the effects from the abolishment of non-tariff barriers and the expected
medium- and long-term efficiency gains from capital inflows and related restructuring.
This applies not only to post-Soviet integration or the AA/DCFTA but, for example, to the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) under negotiation between the EU
and US as well (see Francois et al., 2013).
Regarding the effects of alternative integration scenarios, there is a plethora of different
evaluation approaches, applying various methodologies, assumptions and data sets (see
references for a selection of the relevant literature). Not surprisingly, the evaluation results
differ by wide margins and the issue – economic effects of alternate integration directions
– is excessively politicised. Ukraine has so far rejected a full-fledged BRK-CU member-
ship and has instead acquired ‘observer status’. Apart from tricky geo-political aspects,
important reasons for Ukraine’s reluctant position are its WTO-related commitments and
questions of BRK-CU compatibility with the prospective AA/DCFTA with the EU. While
there seems to be little (economic) justification for Russia prompting Ukraine to join the
BRK-CU (the economic impacts on Russia are rather small, partly owing to its size),
for Ukraine, on the other hand, the economic (and other) linkages to Russia are rather
important.
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Box 1
What is the content of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA?
The EU-UA DCFTA represents part of the Association Agreement and consists of
15 Chapters, 14 Annexes and 3 protocols – altogether more than 900 pages of text pub-
lished in November 2012, with few experts ever having probably actually read it. According
to Chapter 1 (Market Access for Goods), the vast majority of customs duties (99.1% by
Ukraine and 98.1% by the EU) will be removed as soon as the Agreement enters into
force after the ratification process is completed. A few sectors will obtain transition periods
for the removal of customs duties (e.g. the automotive sector in Ukraine for 15 years and
some agriculture products in the EU for up to 10 years); WTO rules will be generally ap-
plied to non-tariffs barriers. According to EC estimates, Ukrainian exporters will save EUR
487 million annually due to reduced EU import duties, while Ukraine will remove around
EUR 390 million in duties on imports from the EU.20 Ukraine will progressively adapt its
technical regulations and standards to those of the EU.21 Chapter 6 (which deals with servi-
ces) aims at the expansion of the EU internal market ‘once Ukraine effectively implements
the EU-acquis’. Similar wording is used in relation to financial services, telecom, postal
and maritime services. Chapter 8 (Public procurement) provides exceptions for the defence
sectors in both Ukraine and the EU. For the first time, Ukraine’s DCFTA includes specific
provisions on trade-related energy issues (Chapter 11; Ukraine is already a member of the
Energy Community Treaty, which imposes an obligation to implement the EU energy acquis
on electricity and gas). These include rules on pricing, the prohibition of dual pricing and
transport interruption to third countries, as well as rules on non-discriminatory access to
the exploration and production of hydrocarbons.22 Importantly, Protocol I of the DCFTA
deals with rules of origin and defines the ‘economic nationality’ of products needed to
determine the duties applicable to traded goods.23 Future EU-Ukraine relations will include
EU-Ukraine summits and the Association Council with the power to take binding decisions.
Last but not least, Article 39 of the agreement explicitly stipulates that the DCFTA ‘shall
not preclude the maintenance or establishment of customs unions, free trade areas or arran-
gements for frontier traffic except insofar as they conflict with trade arrangements provided
for in this agreement’ and consultations regarding these matters will take place within the
Trade Committee.
20 The net effect on Ukraine would thus be a gain of some EUR 100 million. In contrast, at a recent conference
in Kharkiv, Sergey Glazyev predicted a deterioration of Ukraine’s trade balance in the event of DCFTA signature
by USD 5 billion owing to the abolishment of customs duties on 75% of imports (see www.gazeta.ru from
1November, 2013).
21 Ibid., Chapter 3, Technical barriers to trade. There is no available EC estimate for Ukraine’s acquis takeover
costs but, according to Ukrainian sources, these costs are doubtless considerable (see also Dreyer, 2012).
Commissioner Füle, in his speech on 11 October, 2013, mentioned the intention to help with an ‘indicative
amount of EUR 186 million’. For an earlier experience of NMS see Havlik (2003).
22 Note the similar above-quoted conditionality required by the IMF.
23 The latter is one of Russia’s major complaints regarding the incompatibility of the DCFTA and the BRK-CU
(and the existing CIS-wide FTA where Ukraine is a member) and is used as an argument for the erection of trade
barriers.
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Source: European Commission, DG Trade and Industry. For the English
version of the text, see EU Ukraine Association Agreement English –
2012 11 19 EU Ukraine Association Agreement English.pdf published on 19 November,
2012 (a concise summary was published on the European Commission DG Trade website
on 26 February, 2013).
Notwithstanding the above incompatibilities, which would have to be re-negotiated and
would doubtless leave room for compromises, the polarisation of Russian and EU stand-
points regarding these issues is not only endangering future Russian-EU relations, but
is also counterproductive with respect to Ukraine, which remains sandwiched between
the two and would be ultimately adversely affected by EU-Russia frictions the most. As
far as foreign trade volumes are concerned, Russia and the EU are of about the same
importance for Ukraine: Ukraine’s exports to each of the destinations amounted to some
USD 17 billion in 2012. Russia accounted for 26% of Ukraine’s exports and the BRK-
CU (together with Belarus and Kazakhstan) for 33% of Ukraine’s exports in 2012. The
enlarged EU(28) accounted for 25% of Ukraine’s exports in 2012 (see Annex for additional
trade statistics). As regards imports, the situation is similar: 32% of Ukraine’s imports
originated from Russia in 2012 (and more than 40% from the BRK-CU), whereas imports
from the EU(28) accounted for 31% of the total. However, there are important structural
aspects of Ukraine’s trade to either destination: the structure of exports to Russia is more
‘advanced’, since Ukraine’s exports of transport equipment and machinery play a much
bigger role. Some Ukrainian estimates reckon with an additional export and GDP growth
potential from exports to Russia, especially in aircraft, shipbuilding and railwaymachinery
industries.24
With respect to the EU, Ukraine’s exports are specialised on vegetable products, mineral
products (partly refined from Russian oil imports) and base metals. Ukraine’s imports
from Russia are traditionally dominated by mineral products, whereas imports from the
EU consist mostly of chemicals, machinery and transport equipment (Figure 1).
Russia and the EU are thus nearly equally important trading partners for Ukraine. From
a purely trade importance point of view the either-or decision regarding the direction of
Ukraine’s trade integration is rather meaningless: both directions are important. Restricted
access to the Russian market – if trade barriers are introduced by Russia as a punishment
in case of Ukraine’s ‘European integration’ choice – would hit a more advanced part of
Ukraine’s economy (located largely in the eastern part of the country) immediately and
disproportionally, irrespective of the fact that a large part of these exports may represent
remnants of cooperation links from the Soviet past (and are largely not competitive on EU
markets). A BRK-CU-oriented integration of Ukraine would help to maintain and develop
existing technological cooperation linkages, though probably without muchmodernisation
and restructuring pressures (unless Russia itself embarks on a more radical reform path).
On the other hand, the implementation of theAA/DCFTAwith the EUwould bring benefits
to Ukraine only in the medium and long run – especially regarding the expected pressure
24 Calculations by L. Shinkaruk, Institute for Economics and Forecasting, National Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine (mimeo).
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on modernisation and reforms which would eventually lead to a significant restructuring
of the Ukrainian economy and higher FDI inflows. There is little doubt that the EU, as
a more developed economy, would introduce more competition, modernisation and reform
pressures on Ukraine; the EU market is also much bigger than the Russian one.
Figure 1: Structure of Ukraine’s foreign trade (in % of total, 2012)
Note:
I Live animals, animal products;
II Vegetable products
III Animal or vegetable fats, oils, waxes, prepared edible fats
IV Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco and substitutes
V Mineral products
VI Products of the chemical or allied industries
VII Plastics and articles thereof, rubber and articles thereof
VIII Raw hides and skins, leather, furs, etc.
IX Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal, cork, etc.
X Pulp wood, paper or paperboard (incl. recovered) and articles
XI Textiles and textile articles
XII Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, walking sticks, etc.
XIII Articles of stone, plaster, cement, ceramic products, glassware
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XIV Natural or cultured pearls, precious stones and metals, etc.
XV Base metals and articles of base metal
XVI Machinery, mech. appliances, electr. equipment
XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated transport equipment
XVIII Optical, measuring, medical instr., clocks, musical instr., etc.
XX Miscellaneous manufactured articles
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine; own calculations.
As far as customs tariffs are concerned, Ukraine and Russia have a formal free trade
agreement (with some important exceptions for agricultural products such as sugar) while
in trade with the EU, 70.6% of the value of Ukrainian agricultural products and 90.8%
of the value of non-agricultural products were already exported duty-free in 2011. Russia
faced similar tariff protection in the EU for agriculture products like Ukraine while nearly
all Russian non-agricultural exports to the EU were duty free (in value; in terms of the
number of duty-free tariff lines, Ukraine’s agricultural products face greater trade barriers
in the EU – see Table 1 and Annex). Ukraine’s (as well as Russia’s) exports face the
highest tariff protection in dairy products, cereals, sugar, beverages and tobacco, whereas
industrial products generally enjoy more tariff protection in both Ukraine and Russia. In
fact, average final bound duties in both Ukraine and Russia are very similar (except for
animal products, beverages and tobacco, and wood and paper where Russian tariffs are
higher and the harmonisation of tariff lines should not, given the will to negotiate, pose
too big a problem – with the above-quoted few exceptions, see Table 1).
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VI. Conclusion
Cooperation and integration, not confrontation
The earlier (both positive and negative) integration experiences of the new EU Member
States (NMS) may provide a useful reference point for Ukraine. NMS trade integration
with the EU advanced rapidly after they had signed association agreements and inflows
of FDI to the region had already accelerated before EU accession. FDI inflows have
brought new technologies, higher quality standards, and better know-how in management
and marketing (Hunya, 2008). Last but not least, FDI inflows have facilitated access to
EU markets and fostered modernisation; they even contributed to a revival of intra-NMS
trade (Richter, 2011). FDI-induced modernisation was also crucial in raising the energy
efficiency of the recipient countries’ economies (which remains an important challenge
for Ukraine – see Astrov et al., 2012). In this way, the former COMECON countries have
successfully restructured their industrial sector, which in many cases became competitive
on the European scale and has been gaining global market shares (Havlik, 2008). But the
experience of the NMS in the recent crisis has also taught important lessons regarding the
negative effects of capital flows and integration – neither being a panacea with respect to
growth and convergence (see, for example, Gligorov et al., 2012).
In the case of Ukraine – unlike in the above-mentioned NMS countries – one important
factor behind the success restructuring story, namely the ‘carrot’ of prospective EU mem-
bership, is missing and is unlikely to be in place any time soon. Theoretically, Ukraine
(just as Russia) could still try to emulate these developments via closer EU integration
– even without a formal accession anchor, as the Baltic States did in the early 1990s.25
The latter does not rule out that Ukraine maintains close economic links with Russia,
e.g. via a preservation of the current free trade regime (albeit with exemptions and li-
mitations). The BRK-CU members – and first of all Russia – should also advance their
integration with the enlarged EU, at least to the stage of a free trade area. Closer EU-
BRK-CU integration which would include Ukraine is a potentially preferred option in
future, and would, if accompanied by a parallel integration of other EaP countries, lay the
foundation for a broader Pan-European Economic Space and wider Eurasian integration
‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. This could be part of the new inclusive strategy for the EU
Eastern Partnership which would refrain from strategic rivalry with Russia and revitalise
the Partnership for Modernisation, especially in order to avoid trade wars and the raising
of new walls in Europe (Samson, 2002; Havlik, 2010; Emerson, 2011a; Havlik, 2013;
Wisniewski, 2013; etc.).
In summary, both Russia and the EU should abstain from counterproductive geopolitical
games over influence in the EaP region which would have adverse consequences, especi-
ally for the EaP countries concerned. EU-Russia negotiations should not be about Ukraine
or other EaP countries but should involve the latter in the process. All parties should also
continue/resume FTA negotiations – perhaps with a lesser and selective focus on costly
harmonisations of norms and regulations. Last but not least, progress on visa liberalisation
25 It is questionable as to whether this incentive is sufficient for truly sustained reform efforts. WTOmembership
is definitely not a sufficient ‘reform anchor’ – see O. Havrylyshyn in Grinberg et al. (2008).
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procedures and other confidence-building measures should be decisively speeded up and
here it is the EU which should deliver. Apart from confidence building measures, clo-
ser integration of the enlarged EU, Russia and the Eastern Partnership countries – from
‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ – would boost trade and investment, thus fostering badly needed
economic growth and stability in Europe.
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Statistical Annex
Tables from the wiiw Handbook of Statistics: Countries in Transition 2013.
Table A1: Kazakhstan – Foreign trade by country groupings
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
EUR mn1) 2)
Exports, fob
Total 9319 22371 30977 45387 62929 67249
EU-28 2400 9034 15164 23203 30738 35364
EU-15 2181 7752 12705 20391 27253 30665
Other countries3) 6919 13337 15813 22185 32191 31884
Imports, cif
Total 5330 13939 20373 23440 26619 36021
EU-28 1253 3453 5588 5482 5271 7270
EU-15 1074 2995 4805 4567 4355 6069
Other countries3) 4077 10486 14785 17958 21348 28752
Trade balance
Total 3989 8432 10604 21947 36310 31227
EU-28 1147 5581 9576 17721 25467 28095
EU-15 1108 4757 7900 15824 22898 24597
Other countries3) 2842 2851 1028 4226 10843 3133
Annual growth in %
Exports, fob
Total 72.6 38.3 −36.0 46.5 38.6 6.9
EU-28 62.1 59.5 −27.0 53.0 32.5 15.1
EU-15 87.0 52.7 −32.1 60.5 33.7 12.5
Other countries3) 76.6 26.9 −42.7 40.3 45.1 −1.0
Imports, cif
Total 58.6 35.5 −20.9 15.1 13.6 35.3
EU-28 26.9 22.6 −4.3 −1.9 −3.8 37.9
EU-15 29.1 25.9 −3.2 −5.0 −4.6 39.3
Other countries3) 71.8 40.4 −25.7 21.5 18.9 34.7
Shares in %
Exports, fob
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-28 25.8 40.4 49.0 51.1 48.8 52.6
EU-15 23.4 34.7 41.0 44.9 43.3 45.6
Other countries3) 74.2 59.6 51.0 48.9 51.2 47.4
Imports, cif
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-28 23.5 24.8 27.4 23.4 19.8 20.2
EU-15 20.1 21.5 23.6 19.5 16.4 16.8
Other countries3) 76.5 75.2 72.6 76.6 80.2 79.8
1) Officially registered trade.
2) Values in EUR converted from USD to NCU to EUR at the average official exchange rate.
3) Refers to total minus EU-28 from 2000.
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Table A2: Russia – Foreign trade by country groupings
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
EUR mn1)
Exports, fob
Total 111449 193709 216560 299354 371071 408182
EU-28 60780 111619 116080 160210 192189 216319
EU-15 39870 80255 88564 121657 142915 164148
Other countries2) 50668 82090 100480 139143 178882 191863
Imports, cif
Total 36613 79190 120136 172579 219576 246447
EU-28 14617 35375 53962 71947 91606 96044
EU-15 12044 29283 43287 56998 74154 79421
Other countries2) 21996 43815 66174 100632 127970 150403
Trade balance
Total 74836 114519 96424 126775 151495 161735
EU-28 46164 76245 62119 88263 100583 120275
EU-15 27827 50972 45278 64659 68761 84727
Other countries2) 28672 38275 34306 38511 50912 41460
Annual growth in %
Exports, fob
Total 63.0 32.6 −32.0 38.2 24.0 10.0
EU-28 80.1 46.2 −36.4 38.0 20.0 12.6
EU-15 71.0 51.2 −34.2 37.4 17.5 14.9
Other countries2) 46.3 17.7 −26.2 38.5 28.6 7.3
Imports, cif
Total 28.9 30.3 −34.0 43.7 27.2 12.2
EU-28 17.9 27.8 −32.0 33.3 27.3 4.8
EU-15 14.9 28.0 −32.3 31.7 30.1 7.1
Other countries2) 37.4 32.3 −35.5 52.1 27.2 17.5
Shares in %
Exports, fob
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-28 54.5 57.6 53.6 53.5 51.8 53.0
EU-15 35.8 41.4 40.9 40.6 38.5 40.2
Other countries2) 45.5 42.4 46.4 46.5 48.2 47.0
Imports, cif
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-28 39.9 44.7 44.9 41.7 41.7 39.0
EU-15 32.9 37.0 36.0 33.0 33.8 32.2
Other countries2) 60.1 55.3 55.1 58.3 58.3 61.0
1) Values in EUR converted from USD to NCU to EUR at the average official exchange rate.
2) Refers to total minus EU-28 from 2000.
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Table A3: Ukraine – Foreign trade by country groupings
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
EUR mn1)
Exports, fob
Total 15764.6 27455.0 28457.9 38729.2 49129.8 53536.7
EU-28 5215.2 8256.5 6820.9 9858.6 12945.4 13321.2
EU-15 2811.6 4578.1 3906.7 5474.5 6787.7 7371.1
Other countries2) 10549.4 19198.5 21637.0 28870.6 36184.3 40215.5
Imports, cif
Total 15097.7 28985.3 32571.0 45763.8 59340.2 65867.2
EU-28 4378.8 9794.8 11067.9 14428.9 18536.3 20404.6
EU-15 3116.9 6755.8 7225.0 8921.6 11938.4 13168.3
Other countries2) 10718.9 19190.5 21503.1 31334.9 40803.9 45462.6
Trade balance
Total 667.0 −1530.3 −4113.1 −7034.6 −10210.4 −12330.5
EU-28 836.4 −1538.3 −4247.1 −4570.3 −5590.9 −7083.5
EU-15 −305.3 −2177.7 −3318.3 −3447.1 −5150.6 −5797.2
Other countries2) −169.5 8.0 133.9 −2464.3 −4619.5 −5247.1
Annual growth in %
Exports, fob
Total 44.8 4.4 −37.8 36.1 26.9 9.0
EU-28 51.4 −7.3 −45.4 44.5 31.3 2.9
EU-15 41.2 −4.7 −40.7 40.1 24.0 8.6
Other countries2) 41.7 10.4 −35.0 33.4 25.3 11.1
Imports, cif
Total 35.6 24.2 −44.3 40.5 29.7 11.0
EU-28 34.6 27.3 −44.0 30.4 28.5 10.1
EU-15 38.2 23.7 −42.7 23.5 33.8 10.3
Other countries2) 36.0 22.7 −44.4 45.7 30.2 11.4
Shares in %
Exports, fob
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-28 33.1 30.1 24.0 25.5 26.3 24.9
EU-15 17.8 16.7 13.7 14.1 13.8 13.8
Other countries2) 66.9 69.9 76.0 74.5 73.7 75.1
Imports, cif
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EU-28 29.0 33.8 34.0 31.5 31.2 31.0
EU-15 20.6 23.3 22.2 19.5 20.1 20.0
Other countries2) 71.0 66.2 66.0 68.5 68.8 69.0
1) Values in EUR converted from USD to NCU to EUR at the average official exchange rate.
2) Refers to total minus EU-28 from 2000.
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Table A4: Kazakhstan – Exports to top thirty partners
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Total exports, fob, EUR mn1) 9319.0 22370.9 30977.2 45387.1 62928.6 67248.6
Shares in % (ranking in 2012)
Italy 1 10.41 15.05 15.48 15.89 17.17 17.77
China 2 7.65 8.70 13.63 16.79 18.60 16.46
Netherlands 3 2.57 3.15 5.15 6.90 7.58 8.43
Russia 4 19.87 10.51 8.21 9.48 7.99 7.09
France 5 0.18 9.57 7.83 7.36 6.18 6.52
Austria 6 0.01 0.00 2.77 4.20 4.43 5.73
Switzerland 7 5.15 19.78 6.18 2.05 5.66 5.69
Canada 8 0.08 1.90 3.21 4.06 3.00 3.56
Romania 9 0.01 1.65 1.95 2.13 2.59 3.51
Turkey 10 0.71 0.56 1.83 2.05 2.94 3.13
Ukraine 11 2.88 0.72 2.98 1.11 3.05 2.76
United Kingdom 12 2.58 1.15 2.86 2.30 1.85 1.94
Poland 13 0.64 1.32 1.93 2.02 1.49 1.87
Israel 14 . . 2.60 2.12 1.62 1.78
Germany 15 6.25 1.47 2.08 2.90 1.84 1.61
Uzbekistan 16 1.51 0.87 2.06 1.82 1.35 1.36
Portugal 17 . 1.14 0.64 1.22 1.30 1.18
Spain 18 0.07 1.67 1.34 1.53 1.30 0.77
Greece 19 0.01 0.50 1.26 1.65 0.66 0.76
Kyrgyzstan 20 0.66 0.81 0.90 0.70 0.58 0.74
Iran 21 2.31 3.18 2.96 1.81 1.23 0.70
Japan 22 0.11 0.49 0.57 0.89 1.19 0.64
Finland 23 0.79 0.64 1.04 0.45 0.67 0.60
Tajikistan 24 0.60 0.54 0.56 0.43 0.41 0.54
United States 25 2.38 2.39 1.42 1.46 1.17 0.46
Bulgaria 26 0.02 0.00 0.42 0.28 0.55 0.41
Azerbaijan 27 0.53 0.46 0.21 0.57 0.27 0.40
Afghanistan 28 0.66 0.59 0.95 0.60 0.38 0.34
Cyprus 29 0.02 1.03 . 0.01 0.10 0.26
Korea Republic 30 0.41 0.67 0.30 0.39 0.32 0.25
1) Officially registered trade.
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Table A5: Russia – Exports to top thirty partners
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 111449 193709 216560 299354 371071 408182
Shares in % (ranking in 2012)
Netherlands 1 4.22 10.19 12.07 13.59 12.13 14.64
China 2 5.09 5.40 5.53 5.12 6.78 6.81
Germany 3 8.95 8.17 6.20 6.46 6.61 6.78
Italy 4 7.03 7.89 8.32 6.92 6.32 6.18
Turkey 5 3.00 4.49 5.43 5.12 4.91 5.23
Ukraine 6 4.87 5.14 4.59 5.83 5.90 5.18
Belarus 7 5.40 4.19 5.54 4.55 4.82 4.68
Poland 8 4.32 3.57 4.14 3.76 4.14 3.79
Japan 9 2.68 1.55 2.40 3.23 2.83 2.97
Kazakhstan 10 2.18 2.71 3.03 2.69 2.73 2.87
United Kingdom 11 4.53 3.43 3.01 2.85 2.71 2.86
Korea Republic 12 0.94 0.98 1.88 2.63 2.59 2.63
United States 13 4.50 2.62 3.03 3.10 3.18 2.47
Finland 14 3.01 3.17 3.04 3.06 2.55 2.29
Switzerland 15 3.74 4.46 2.06 2.20 2.22 2.05
France 16 1.85 2.53 2.89 3.13 2.88 2.01
Latvia 17 1.58 0.49 1.37 1.48 1.43 1.70
India 18 1.05 0.96 1.97 1.61 1.18 1.51
Belgium 19 0.73 1.02 1.34 1.24 1.45 1.30
Hungary 20 2.33 2.07 1.29 1.35 1.50 1.27
Sweden 21 1.68 0.96 1.06 0.90 0.99 1.18
Slovakia 22 2.06 1.32 0.98 1.15 1.37 1.17
Greece 23 1.23 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.91 1.13
Spain 24 1.04 1.17 0.96 1.02 1.19 1.09
Lithuania 25 2.01 1.66 1.13 0.89 1.40 1.03
Czech Republic 26 1.69 1.58 1.47 1.39 1.05 1.00
Bulgaria 27 0.57 0.79 0.73 0.86 0.68 0.83
Estonia 28 1.20 0.88 0.38 0.43 0.55 0.70
Taiwan 29 0.39 0.60 0.26 0.45 0.41 0.63
Egypt 30 0.44 0.43 0.60 0.48 0.45 0.61
 - 10.2478/danb-2014-0002
Downloaded from PubFactory at 07/25/2016 10:53:53AM
via International Institute for Applied Syst
DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, 5 (1), 21–51
DOI: 10.2478/danb-2014-0002
41
Table A6: Ukraine – Exports to top thirty partners
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 15764.6 27455.0 28457.9 38729.2 49129.8 53536.7
Shares in % (ranking in 2012)
Russia 1 24.12 21.88 21.40 26.12 28.98 25.62
Turkey 2 5.96 5.92 5.36 5.89 5.48 5.36
Egypt 3 1.52 2.33 2.55 0.43 1.95 4.21
Poland 4 2.87 2.95 3.04 3.48 4.09 3.74
Italy 5 4.38 5.53 3.09 4.69 4.44 3.60
Kazakhstan 6 0.53 1.95 3.57 2.53 2.72 3.57
India 7 1.15 2.15 2.90 0.97 3.31 3.33
Belarus 8 1.87 2.60 3.17 3.69 2.81 3.27
China 9 4.32 2.08 3.61 0.91 3.19 2.58
Germany 10 5.09 3.75 3.14 2.92 2.58 2.39
Spain 11 1.12 1.68 1.44 0.80 1.42 2.24
Hungary 12 2.25 2.01 1.84 1.67 1.96 2.19
Lebanon 13 0.42 0.30 1.75 0.58 1.99 2.07
Iran 14 0.62 1.69 1.90 0.55 1.65 1.69
United States 15 4.98 2.79 0.63 1.58 1.63 1.47
Saudi Arabia 16 0.25 1.13 1.26 0.16 1.19 1.35
Netherlands 17 0.95 1.51 1.50 1.10 1.22 1.21
Moldova 18 1.21 1.98 1.75 1.39 1.28 1.20
Israel 19 0.73 0.85 0.99 0.31 0.75 1.16
Azerbaijan 20 0.28 0.85 1.38 1.19 1.04 1.11
Czech Republic 21 1.30 1.10 0.86 1.22 1.23 1.03
Slovakia 22 1.58 1.48 1.09 1.11 1.23 0.98
Syria 23 1.10 1.96 1.90 0.36 1.35 0.84
Bulgaria 24 2.62 1.59 1.00 0.88 1.10 0.83
Romania 25 1.13 1.43 0.80 1.37 1.39 0.80
United Kingdom 26 0.94 1.05 0.87 0.99 0.71 0.80
France 27 0.77 0.58 1.11 0.93 0.83 0.80
Georgia 28 0.26 0.58 1.00 1.03 0.96 0.79
Jordan 29 0.31 0.53 1.20 0.20 0.66 0.78
Turkmenistan 30 1.02 0.55 0.82 0.41 0.35 0.77
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Table A7: Kazakhstan – Imports from top thirty partners
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Total imports, cif, EUR mn1) 5329.9 13939.0 20372.8 23440.1 26618.5 36021.2
Shares in % (ranking in 2012)
Russia 1 48.40 37.98 31.32 39.38 41.38 36.59
China 2 3.00 7.21 12.56 12.73 13.55 16.08
Germany 3 6.66 7.50 7.19 5.93 5.62 8.26
Ukraine 4 1.61 4.87 7.50 4.37 4.68 6.33
United States 5 5.50 6.94 4.90 4.24 4.63 4.60
Italy 6 3.09 3.91 6.74 5.10 3.09 2.11
Korea Republic 7 1.66 1.48 1.32 1.69 1.68 2.09
Japan 8 2.09 3.45 2.24 1.80 1.74 1.97
Turkey 9 2.86 2.30 2.01 1.99 1.97 1.74
Uzbekistan 10 1.40 1.47 1.07 1.52 2.08 1.74
Belarus 11 0.78 1.20 1.29 1.70 1.60 1.43
France 12 1.50 1.68 1.62 1.60 1.86 1.41
United Kingdom 13 4.43 2.44 2.47 2.34 1.42 1.30
Poland 14 1.16 1.14 1.48 1.22 1.06 1.04
Kyrgyzstan 15 0.60 0.68 0.41 0.53 0.65 0.79
India 16 0.91 0.58 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.72
Czech Republic 17 0.67 0.55 0.63 0.54 0.44 0.70
Brazil 18 0.55 0.96 0.71 0.75 0.92 0.65
Netherlands 19 1.30 0.81 1.12 0.97 0.79 0.62
Austria 20 0.36 0.90 0.89 0.71 0.60 0.58
Sweden 21 0.51 1.51 0.92 0.67 0.84 0.54
Finland 22 1.14 1.14 1.09 0.67 0.67 0.54
Spain 23 0.18 0.44 0.42 0.32 0.40 0.50
Switzerland 24 1.08 1.16 0.55 0.58 0.42 0.48
Canada 25 0.46 0.73 0.87 0.70 0.47 0.45
Belgium 26 0.66 0.83 0.55 0.57 0.48 0.44
Lithuania 27 0.19 0.16 0.38 0.35 0.27 0.41
Turkmenistan 28 0.86 0.29 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.39
Hungary 29 0.51 0.40 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.31
Ireland 30 . . 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.27
1) Officially registered trade.
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Table A8: Russia – Imports from top thirty partners
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 36613 79190 120136 172579 219576 246447
Shares in % (ranking in 2012)
China 1 2.80 7.36 13.62 17.02 15.78 15.40
Germany 2 11.51 13.45 12.69 11.66 12.32 12.09
Ukraine 3 10.78 7.92 5.46 6.14 6.58 5.68
Japan 4 1.69 5.91 4.33 4.48 4.91 4.95
United States 5 7.95 4.62 5.48 4.85 4.77 4.83
France 6 3.50 3.72 5.04 4.39 4.34 4.35
Italy 7 3.58 4.47 4.72 4.39 4.38 4.24
Belarus 8 10.95 5.79 4.01 4.35 4.48 3.56
Kazakhstan 9 6.49 3.27 2.21 1.94 2.34 2.72
United Kingdom 10 2.54 2.81 2.12 2.00 2.35 2.59
Korea Republic 11 1.06 4.06 2.91 3.18 3.79 2.17
Turkey 12 1.03 1.75 1.92 2.13 2.08 2.16
Poland 13 2.11 2.78 2.52 2.55 2.18 2.13
Netherlands 14 2.18 1.97 2.14 1.94 1.94 1.61
Finland 15 2.83 3.14 2.36 2.00 1.85 1.51
Spain 16 0.92 1.24 1.36 1.33 1.41 1.24
Belgium 17 1.42 1.50 1.52 1.43 1.35 1.18
Czech Republic 18 1.08 1.00 1.39 1.27 1.47 1.12
Brazil 19 1.14 2.38 2.08 1.78 1.44 1.03
Austria 20 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.08 1.02 0.99
Sweden 21 1.37 1.88 1.22 1.25 1.32 0.94
India 22 1.64 0.79 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.93
Hungary 23 1.19 1.11 1.57 1.37 1.09 0.88
Switzerland 24 0.80 0.89 1.17 1.05 0.97 0.86
Vietnam 25 0.11 0.18 0.41 0.49 0.56 0.71
Slovakia 26 0.31 0.51 1.08 1.09 0.97 0.66
Denmark 27 1.02 0.93 0.82 0.74 0.67 0.63
Canada 28 0.57 0.52 0.72 0.65 0.60 0.61
Taiwan 29 0.26 0.50 0.55 0.67 0.67 0.60
Norway 30 0.46 0.76 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.56
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Table A9: Ukraine – Imports from top thirty partners
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 15097.7 28985.3 32571.0 45763.8 59340.2 65867.2
Shares in % (ranking in 2012)
Russia 1 41.74 35.54 29.13 36.54 35.27 32.39
China 2 0.94 5.01 6.02 2.03 7.59 9.33
Germany 3 8.13 9.36 8.48 7.58 8.31 8.04
Belarus 4 4.31 2.60 3.73 4.23 5.10 5.99
Poland 5 2.24 3.89 4.78 4.59 3.85 4.21
United States 6 2.58 1.96 2.83 2.91 3.14 3.43
Italy 7 2.48 2.85 2.51 2.29 2.43 2.64
Turkey 8 1.15 1.68 2.10 2.14 1.79 2.31
France 9 1.69 2.21 2.14 1.82 1.82 1.97
Korea Republic 10 0.79 1.79 1.25 0.46 1.50 1.83
Kazakhstan 11 2.96 0.52 4.48 1.26 2.03 1.77
Czech Republic 12 1.17 1.64 1.37 1.23 1.43 1.47
Japan 13 0.71 1.52 1.14 1.32 1.23 1.41
Hungary 14 1.19 1.79 1.49 2.00 1.61 1.37
United Kingdom 15 1.45 1.39 1.43 1.35 1.37 1.36
Netherlands 16 1.05 1.28 1.49 1.38 1.44 1.33
India 17 0.54 0.89 1.05 0.28 0.98 1.21
Romania 18 0.35 0.59 1.07 1.12 1.36 1.10
Lithuania 19 0.97 0.55 0.90 1.05 1.00 1.08
Singapore 20 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.97
Switzerland 21 1.55 0.70 0.96 0.84 0.96 0.90
Spain 22 0.72 0.65 0.82 0.77 0.83 0.88
Austria 23 1.33 1.27 1.35 1.15 0.86 0.87
Belgium 24 0.97 0.87 1.02 0.97 0.80 0.84
Slovakia 25 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.69
Brazil 26 0.67 0.86 0.83 0.17 0.66 0.68
Sweden 27 1.08 1.51 0.99 0.59 0.77 0.64
Finland 28 0.69 0.97 0.93 0.71 0.63 0.57
Indonesia 29 0.20 0.34 0.57 0.20 0.64 0.49
Norway 30 0.32 0.35 0.57 0.43 0.33 0.45
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Table A10: Kazakhstan – Exports and imports by SITC commodity groups
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Exports1)
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 9319.0 22370.9 30977.2 45387.1 62928.6 67248.6
Shares in %
0 Food and live animals 6.7 2.2 3.5 3.1 1.8 2.9
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 7.5 6.7 6.0 5.4 6.9 6.2
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 52.8 70.1 69.5 71.7 72.0 69.9
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 1.1 1.9 4.5 4.4 3.3 3.8
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 26.9 16.7 13.7 13.0 13.7 14.0
7 Machinery and transport equipment 2.2 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.4
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 2.0 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.0
Imports1)
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 5329.9 13939.0 20372.8 23440.1 26618.5 36021.2
Shares in %
0 Food and live animals 7.1 5.7 6.8 8.0 8.7 7.8
1 Beverages and tobacco 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 2.8 2.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.3
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 11.4 11.9 10.0 9.9 12.8 10.8
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 10.2 9.3 10.0 11.9 10.4 10.3
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 18.8 21.6 26.5 18.1 17.3 19.7
7 Machinery and transport equipment 39.7 41.5 37.0 40.3 35.8 38.0
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 6.4 6.5 6.8 9.0 11.8 9.4
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4
1) Officially registered trade.
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Table A11: Russia – Exports and imports by SITC commodity groups
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Exports
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 111449 193709 216560 299354 371071 408182
Shares in %
0 Food and live animals 0.9 1.3 2.5 1.6 1.8 2.5
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 4.5 4.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 2.4
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 50.6 61.8 63.0 65.6 67.0 70.3
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 6.0 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.7
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 17.8 14.8 12.3 11.2 9.8 9.5
7 Machinery and transport equipment 6.2 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.7
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 11.8 8.4 10.1 10.8 10.8 6.6
Imports
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 36613 79190 120136 172579 219576 246447
Shares in %
0 Food and live animals 15.6 12.8 13.1 11.6 10.1 10.2
1 Beverages and tobacco 3.3 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 7.2 3.7 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.2
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 4.1 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.3
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 11.8 12.7 13.1 12.8 11.7 12.1
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 13.9 13.0 11.5 11.9 11.6 12.8
7 Machinery and transport equipment 24.5 39.9 37.1 39.0 41.9 31.5
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 7.2 7.0 10.2 11.0 10.0 11.3
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 11.2 6.2 8.0 8.2 9.1 16.7
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Table A12: Ukraine – Exports and imports by SITC commodity groups
2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Exports
Total exports, fob, EUR mn 15764.6 27455.0 28457.9 38729.2 49129.8 53536.7
Shares in %
0 Food and live animals1) 6.3 10.3 16.8 12.2 11.7 17.4
1 Beverages and tobacco . . . . . .
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 12.7 7.2 9.6 10.4 11.0 10.3
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 5.5 9.8 5.4 7.1 8.3 5.3
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 1.6 1.7 4.4 5.0 4.8 6.0
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 9.0 9.0 6.2 6.7 7.9 7.3
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 45.6 44.1 36.1 37.1 33.3 28.8
7 Machinery and transport equipment 12.3 12.6 16.6 17.3 12.9 14.4
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.8
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 2.4 1.6 0.8 0.7 7.1 7.6
Imports
Total imports, cif, EUR mn 15097.7 28985.3 32571.0 45763.8 59340.2 65867.2
Shares in %
0 Food and live animals1) 5.9 6.5 9.5 8.2 6.3 7.2
1 Beverages and tobacco . . . . . .
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 5.6 3.9 3.4 3.7 2.8 2.6
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 43.0 29.5 32.2 32.3 34.6 30.9
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 8.8 11.7 15.3 14.3 11.9 12.1
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 12.8 14.6 13.7 14.4 12.5 11.6
7 Machinery and transport equipment 17.5 25.0 18.5 19.6 16.6 19.5
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3.6 5.4 5.8 6.0 3.9 5.1
9 Commodities not classified elsewhere in the SITC 2.6 2.9 0.9 1.0 11.0 10.4
1) Including beverages and tobacco.
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Final bound duties MFN applied duties Imports
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Binding AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free
in % in % in % in % in %
Petroleum 5.0 0 5 100 4.5 10.0 5 1.1 1.3
Chemicals 5.2 0.4 10 100 6.4 5.8 21 13.8 13.2
Wood, paper, etc. 7.9 5.0 15 100 12.8 6.1 30 3.3 9.8
Textiles 7.8 0 18 100 10.9 0.6 37 2.1 2.7
Clothing 11.8 0 42 100 19.6 0 100 2.4 0
Leather, footwear, etc. 6.4 0 15 100 10.3 8.7 176 3.2 7.7
Non-electrical machinery 5.8 7.9 15 100 3.4 66.2 21 18.7 73.6
Electrical machinery 6.2 23.3 16 100 7.3 25.2 27 11.1 37.8
Transport equipment 8.9 2.5 20 100 10.6 17.7 35 16.1 29.9
Manufactures, n.e.s. 8.4 7.9 20 100 11.4 17.2 190 4.4 39.7
Part B Exports to major trading partners and duties faced
Bilateral imports Diversification MFN AVG of Pref. Duty-free imports
Major markets in million 95% trade in no. of traded TL margin TL Value
US$ HS 2-digit HS 6-digit Simple Weighted Weighted in % in %
Agricultural products
1. Kazakhstan 2011 1,569 22 120 20.8 24.5 24.5 100.0 100.0
2. European Union 2011 1,510 22 55 14.6 7.9 1.3 21.8 67.7
3. Egypt 2011 1,386 2 2 112.0 0.5 0.0 25.0 97.4
4. Turkey 2011 863 6 13 29.5 85.4 0.0 14.2 3.7
5. Ukraine 2011 679 12 49 9.8 10.4 8.8 96.1 80.8
Non-agricultural products
1. European Union 2011 241,503 16 62 4.1 0.3 0.2 69.5 97.1
2. China 2011 40,298 18 46 7.7 1.4 0.0 17.1 73.3
3. United States 2011 33,383 19 49 2.3 0.2 0.1 87.7 33.4
4. Ukraine 2011 28,386 45 347 3.7 0.9 0.9 100.0 100.0
5. Belarus 2011 23,958 50 540 9.5 3.3 3.3 100.0 100.0
Source: WTO (http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/).
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Table B2: Tariffs and imports, Ukraine
Part A.1 Tariffs and imports: Summary and duty ranges
Summary Total Ag Non-Ag WTO member since 2008
Simple average final bound 5.8 11.0 5.0 Binding coverage: Total 100
Simple average MFN applied 2012 4.5 9.5 3.7 Non-Ag 100
Trade weighted average 2011 2.7 9.1 2.2 Ag: Tariff quotas (in %) 0.1
Imports in billion US$ 2011 82.2 5.8 76.3 Ag: Special safeguards (in % ) 0
Duty-free 0 <= 5 5 <= 10 10 <= 15 15 <= 25 25 <= 50 50 <= 100 > 100 NAV
Frequency distribution Tariff lines and import values (in %) in %
Agricultural products
Final bound 12.6 19.6 27.5 13.9 25.5 0.8 0.1 0 1.0
MFN applied 2012 21.1 22.0 26.3 12.1 17.5 0.8 0.2 0.1 0
Imports 2011 39.3 20.4 28.4 5.8 1.6 3.8 0.7 0.0 0
Non-agricultural products
Final bound 33.8 16.8 43.0 5.8 0.5 0 0 0 0.0
MFN applied 2012 43.1 29.9 21.3 5.4 0.3 0 0.0 0 0
Imports 2011 66.4 18.1 14.7 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0
Part A.2 Tariffs and imports by product groups
Final bound duties MFN applied duties Imports
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Binding AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free
in % in % in % in % in %
Animal products 13.0 0 20 100 11.0 9.0 20 0.5 15.0
Dairy products 10.0 0 10 100 10.0 0 10 0.2 0
Fruit, vegetables, plants 13.1 10.2 20 100 9.9 18.9 20 1.4 54.6
Coffee, tea 5.8 35.4 20 100 5.8 35.4 20 1.3 42.0
Cereals & preparations 12.7 3.3 20 100 12.6 3.8 20 0.9 27.1
Oilseeds, fats & oils 10.7 11.0 30 100 8.3 20.1 30 0.9 89.9
Sugars and confectionery 17.5 0.6 50 100 17.5 0 50 0.3 0
Beverages & tobacco 7.9 25.7 64 100 12.2 26.2 424 1.2 23.9
Cotton 1.4 40.0 5 100 1.4 40.0 5 0.0 61.3
Other agricultural products 7.6 23.9 20 100 5.5 45.2 20 0.5 19.3
Fish & fish products 3.7 61.7 20 100 2.6 68.2 20 0.7 68.0
Minerals & metals 4.5 42.4 20 100 3.0 47.6 20 32.8 79.0
Continued on next page
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Final bound duties MFN applied duties Imports
Product groups AVG Duty-free Max Binding AVG Duty-free Max Share Duty-free
in % in % in % in % in %
Petroleum 1.5 72.0 10 100 0.9 84.3 10 13.7 97.3
Chemicals 5.1 16.1 10 100 3.2 39.3 65 12.7 55.4
Wood, paper, etc. 0.4 95.8 10 100 0.3 95.8 10 3.1 99.1
Textiles 4.1 33.7 13 100 3.8 35.6 13 2.1 25.6
Clothing 11.4 1.0 12 100 11.3 1.1 12 0.6 0.1
Leather, footwear, etc. 7.2 14.9 25 100 5.4 27.0 25 1.9 20.3
Non-electrical machinery 4.2 38.7 12 100 2.1 51.3 10 8.8 62.4
Electrical machinery 5.3 33.0 25 100 3.8 39.1 25 6.8 34.2
Transport equipment 7.5 15.8 20 100 5.1 39.6 20 7.5 21.4
Manufactures, n.e.s. 6.4 31.9 25 100 5.5 32.0 25 2.1 68.6
Part B Exports to major trading partners and duties faced
Bilateral imports Diversification MFN AVG of Pref. Duty-free imports
Major markets in million 95% trade in no. of traded TL margin TL Value
US$ HS 2-digit HS 6-digit Simple Weighted Weighted in % in %
Agricultural products
1. European Union 2011 3,627 15 25 13.7 4.5 0.9 27.3 70.6
2. Russian Federation 2011 2,093 17 77 15.6 20.9 20.9 99.7 100.0
3. Turkey 2011 1,183 4 11 30.6 46.7 0.0 12.7 2.2
4. Egypt 2011 997 3 5 4.6 0.2 0.0 24.3 95.3
5. India 2011 903 1 1 40.2 2.2 0.0 15.6 95.9
Non-agricultural products
1. Russian Federation 2011 17,846 45 514 9.6 7.9 7.9 100.0 100.0
2. European Union 2011 14,866 37 249 4.0 0.9 0.6 71.5 90.8
3. Turkey 2011 3,564 14 50 5.0 7.3 0.7 66.1 39.6
4. China 2011 3,174 11 17 8.0 0.9 0.0 16.1 77.7
5. Belarus 2011 1,615 43 477 9.4 7.3 7.3 100.0 100.0
Source: WTO (http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfiles/).
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